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The role of law in global value chains: a research manifesto 
 
The IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group* 
 
Abstract: Most scholars attribute the development and ubiquity of 
global value chains to economic forces, treating law as an exogenous 
factor, if at all. By contrast, we assert the centrality of legal regimes and 
private ordering mechanisms to the creation, structure, geography, dis-
tributive effects and governance of GVCs, and thereby seek to establish 
the study of law and GVCs as rich and important terrain for research in 
its own right.  
 
 
Across a growing number of sectors and industries, value production is not just transnational 
in scope; it is organised and coordinated via global networks that link activities across as well 
as within firms and nations (‘Global Value Chains’ (GVCs), as they are increasingly known). 
The asserted causes of this phenomenon are multiple, and scholars debate which deserves des-
ignation as primary.1 We begin from the premise that GVCs are not only the product of shifting 
economic conditions. They also arise as firms engage dynamically with multiple, overlapping 
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and Policy (IGLP) at Harvard University School of Law. 
1 Among the most frequent causes cited are the dominance of shareholder value theory—W Milberg & D Winkler, 
Outsourcing Economics: Global Value Chains in Capitalist Development (Cambridge UP, 2013)—trade liberal-
ization and new regional and bilateral trade and investment agreements—UNCTAD, Global Value Chains and 
Development: Investment and Value Added Trade in the Global Economy, UN Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/2013/1 
(2013)—and technologies enabling cheaper and faster transportation and logistics—D Cowen, The Deadly Life 
of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade (University of Minnesota Press, 2014). 
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and often conflicting local, national, regional, and transnational legal regimes, soft-law norma-
tive orders and private ordering mechanisms (hereinafter collectively described as ‘law’).2 
 
This article seeks to establish the importance for both scholars and policy-makers of investi-
gating some of the complex ways law shapes and is shaped by GVCs. The research agenda 
articulated here emerged from a series of ongoing conversations among a group of legal schol-
ars, sociologists, and political economists that first met in June 2014 under the auspices of the 
Institute for Global Law and Policy (IGLP) at Harvard University. For the most part, legal 
scholarship has only summarily or incidentally analysed GVCs, and similarly, GVCs scholars 
outside law have not made law a focal point of their theoretical or empirical analyses. We 
believe that placing law at the centre of the analysis of what have historically been treated as 
primarily ‘economic structures’ will not only enrich our understanding of the shape, nature, 
and dynamic character of GVCs, but will also help to illuminate the complex inter-relationship 
between law and global political economy more broadly.   
 
We begin with a broad description of the question at the heart of our collective inquiry: how 
does law shape the structure and organisation of production globally and how is law impacted 
through this process? To make this meta-question more concrete, we articulate three thematic 
starting points for exploration of the relationship between law and GVCs: law and the geogra-
phy of GVCs; law and the production and distribution of value and power in GVCs; and law 
and the coordination of GVCs (the latter being a process referred to in the GVC literature as 
‘governance’). We focus our research inquiry of the role of law in global structures of produc-
tion on GVCs both because of their ubiquity in modern capitalism and because of the rich 
variety of extant scholarship (largely outside the field of law) exploring GVCs in a variety of 
                                                 
2 At first blush, the areas of law most implicated in GVCs could include company, contract, employment and tax 
law, as well as international trade law, commercial and investment law. Yet, when one begins to consider the 
diverse impacts of GVCs economically, socially, politically, environmentally, and so forth, it is hard to think of a 
field of law that might not be relevant to them, from human rights law to environmental law to laws governing 
the behaviour of firms in elections or upon the legislative process. In addition, soft law regimes, including guide-
lines on corporate social responsibility, technical standards, fair trade and other ethical certification standards, and 
customary rules of business practice will also likely be significant to the extent that they shape behaviour of firms 
individually or collectively in GVCs. Moreover, the practices of firms as they deal with each other commercially, 
through trade or industry associations or in influencing behaviour of other firms in the chain—what might be 
loosely termed ‘private ordering mechanisms’, will also be important if we are trying to understand how GVCs 
are coordinated or how risk and reward are distributed through chain structures. We recognise that the boundaries 
between these diverse normative orders, at least in terms of their effects, is becoming increasingly difficult to 
maintain, and observation of business practices quickly reveals that a contractual term might be as significant as 
a public law regulation in shaping the behaviour of actors in global commerce. For these reasons, we use ‘law’ as 
a shorthand for hard and soft law regimes and private ordering mechanisms. 
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industries and contexts. This combination of factors makes GVCs a rich source for research 
both empirically and theoretically. In an effort to suggest, albeit in a highly preliminary way, 
what a legal analysis of GVCs might entail, and what insights this line of inquiry might yield, 
we include brief descriptions of several ongoing research projects initiated by group members. 
Our goal is to invite scholars in law and related disciplines to begin to view the study of law 
and global production as an important and worthy field of research in its own right.  
 
THE CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
We are hardly the first to acknowledge the significance of GVCs as a feature of modern capi-
talism. Former Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Pascal Lamy re-
cently observed that GVCs, as the ‘face of the modern global economy’, are creating a ‘new 
world of trade’.3 The United Nations Conference on Trade Development (UNCTAD) recently 
dedicated its annual flagship publication, the World Investment Report, to the topic of GVCs. 
It includes a definition of GVCs and a quantitative estimate of their importance in the world 
economy:  
 
Global investment and trade are inextricably intertwined through the international pro-
duction networks of firms investing in productive assets worldwide and trading inputs 
and outputs in cross-border value chains of various degrees of complexity. Such value 
chains (intra-firm or inter-firm, regional or global in nature, and commonly referred to 
as Global Value Chains or GVCs) shaped by TNCs [transnational corporations] account 
for some 80% of global trade.4  
 
While references to GVCs have proliferated rapidly in recent years, in both academic and pol-
icy circles, our intervention is motivated by the puzzling fact that there is as yet no well-devel-
oped account of the role of law in the structure, operation or governance of GVCs.5 In fact, we 
observe that law has, for the most part, been neglected by the political economists, sociologists, 
                                                 
3 P Lamy, ‘Global Value Chains and the New World of Trade’, Keynote address, Duke GVC Global Summit, 20 
October 2014, available at https://globalvaluechains.org/video/duke-global-summit-keynote-address (last visited 
7 January 2016).  
4 UNCTAD (2013) iii.  
5 One notable exception is Kevin Sobel-Read’s recent article ‘Global Value Chains: A Framework for Analysis’ 
5 Transnational Legal Theory (2014) 364, which seeks to bring the insights of GVC scholarship to the attention 
of legal scholars, and perhaps more ambitiously, to consider the scholarly value and potential of exploring law 
and GVCs in relation to one another. 
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economic geographers and other social scientists that have pioneered GVCs as a field of study. 
To the extent that law is recognised in the GVC literature, it is generally treated as exogenous 
rather than an endogenous factor—an institutional backdrop against which the economic and 
inter-organisational dynamics driving the globalisation of production play out. This lacuna is 
all the more striking because in recent years the GVC framework has gained considerable reach 
beyond academic circles to business consultancies, legislators, international organisations, un-
ions and activists.6 
 
It seems possible that this externalisation of law and the ‘legal’ from GVC analysis to date may 
derive from an understanding of capitalism as a process of profit-oriented, mutually beneficial 
exchange undertaken in (relatively) free markets. In such a vision, the function of law is pri-
marily to provide market-facilitating institutions (such as property, contract and the corpora-
tion) and rules to correct informational and other asymmetries in the market rather than as a 
tool and terrain for struggle over the terms through which value will be generated and distrib-
uted or power exercised in global production systems. Most considerations of law in GVCs 
take the former more minimal conceptualization of law’s role in capitalism as a given, without 
interrogating what role law might play in bringing this particular form of GVC capitalism into 
being. For instance, spurred on by management studies, early business law scholarship address-
ing GVCs was concerned with the design of supply contracts in order to enhance efficiency 
and surmount informational asymmetries.7 In general, the GVC literature continues to treat 
economic units (or firms) with different national origins and varied sizes, productive capacities 
and bargaining power as an analytical given, rather than a product of legal arrangements that 
could be organized differently. 
 
In our view, law is more than an ‘external’ or contextual factor shaping the strategic decision-
making of firms ‘inside’ GVCs.8 Rather, we argue that law resides at the heart of the GVC 
phenomenon—it is the vehicle through which value is generated, captured, and distributed 
                                                 
6 For a summary of the various contexts, groups and institutions that make use of the GVC framework, see Global 
Value Chains Initiative, ‘Institutions’, available at https://globalvaluechains.org/institutions (last visited 7 January 
2016) and, recently, OECD & World Bank Group, ‘Inclusive Global Value Chains’, Report prepared for submis-
sion to G20 Trade Ministers Meeting Istanbul (2015), available at http://www.oecd.org/trade/OECD-WBG-g20-
gvc-report-2015.pdf (last visited 7 January 2016).  
7 For an overview cf. M Hoehn, Relational Supply Contracts (Springer 2009) 19-34. 
8 Cf. G Gereffi, ‘Global production systems and Third World development’, in B Stallings (ed.), Global Change, 
Regional Response: The New International Context of Development, (Cambridge UP, 1995) 100 and A Stewart, 
Gender, Law and Justice in a Global Market (Cambridge UP, 2011).  
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within and between organisational and jurisdictional domains and diverse and geographically 
disparate business operations are coordinated and governed.9 This recognition of the signifi-
cance of law is important for a richer understanding of modern capitalism as well as the for-
mulation and critique of policy programmes and interventions. For example, rather than asking 
how firms can use law to upgrade a particular chain configuration, we aim instead to understand 
how the possibilities for upgrading are already structured in and through law—that is, how law 
constitutes the power relations between actors that give rise to particular forms of governance 
and engender particular distributive effects. This focus on the role that legal frameworks play 
at different levels of a particular chain and on the politico-economic power dynamics that op-
erate behind competing legal norms can help facilitate a critical assessment of the structural 
and distributional dimensions of GVCs—and the global economy more broadly—that are often 
taken for granted or normalised. Such an imaginative legal exercise can then help to elucidate 
alternative and potentially more progressive sites of intervention by scholars, policymakers and 
civil society groups.    
 
Research on law and GVCs undertaken in this spirit also suggests that the proliferation of 
GVCs has implications for law and legal scholarship more broadly. Many fields of legal inquiry 
are organised around distinctions that are blurred or confounded by the global organisation of 
GVCs. The study of GVCs may aid legal scholars in formulating alternatives to traditionally 
recognised disciplinary boundaries between local and global, law and non-law, public regula-
tion and private ordering, form and substance, rules and norms, firm and contract, and firm and 
state.10 In addition, because GVCs frequently traverse legal forms, geographic and jurisdic-
tional boundaries and multiple layers of potentially applicable law, mapping GVCs from a legal 
perspective also poses complex challenges for basic questions of positive legal analysis, in-
cluding matters of territorial jurisdiction, governing law, private regulation through contract, 
and sovereign authority. 11  
                                                 
9 ‘Governance’ is a genuinely interdisciplinary concept. In the legal literature, it is generally used as a shorthand 
for the public (municipal, state, supranational) and private (e.g. through private standard-setting and certification) 
regulation of, in this case, the GVC. Here, ‘governance’ is used to refer to the shift from traditional towards more 
sophisticated regulatory techniques which gain traction through knowledge and markets rather than legal sanc-
tions. Cf. for a comparative view P Zumbansen, ‘Governance from an Interdisciplinary Perspective’, in D Levi-
Faur (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Governance (Oxford UP, 2012). The GVC literature speaks of the ‘governance’ 
or management/coordination by the lead firm of the chain. Unless reference is made to the multiple normative 
layers shaping GVCs, this article will use the term in the latter meaning. 
10 Cf. Sobel-Read (2014) 404.  
11 Cf. David Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ 34 Ohio Northern University Law Review (2008) 
827, 832: ‘[A]s the world is re-ordered, law will be there, imagining it, making it, writing it down, consolidating 
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Moreover, just as the boundaries between legal sub-fields are increasingly hard to draw, so too 
are the boundaries between what is hard law and what is soft law, or what legal significance is 
to be given to private ordering mechanisms. We find the study of GVCs is particularly fruitful 
for forcing a re-examination of these complex questions regarding the boundaries of law it-
self.12 For example, GVCs often generate unique inter-firm and cross-border norms of business 
practice such as chain-wide corporate codes that, albeit of private origin, shape parties’ behav-
iour as powerfully as legal commands emanating from legislation.13 Also, both public and pri-
vate norms surrounding GVCs are entangled with rapidly changing business practice and pol-
icies giving rise to novel public/private regulatory arrangements such as the Bangladesh Ac-
cord on Building and Fire Safety.14 As such, GVCs are an important source of norm-creation 
contributing to global legal pluralism, and this scholarship’s inquiry into the co-existence and 
collision of different normative orders provides a helpful tool to analyse the complexity of 
normative assemblages at play.15   
  
Our analysis of law and GVCs draws on and aims to contribute to several strands of contem-
porary legal thought. For instance, Marxist legal scholars have theorised the relationship be-
tween capital and law as symbiotic,16 and the analysis of the constitutive role of law in GVCs 
provides the opportunity to deepen our understanding of the complex dynamics of this rela-
tionship. While system theory has been used to describe co-evolutionary processes of law and 
                                                 
and contesting the new arrangements.’ 
12 Cf. D Schneiderman, ‘Power and Production in Global Legal Pluralism: An International Political Economy 
Approach’, in A Perry-Kessaris (ed.), Socio-Legal Approaches to International Economic Law (Routledge, 2013) 
98. 
13 Cf. L Catá Backer, ‘Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global Private Lawmaking: 
Wal-Mart as Global Legislator’ 37 University of Connecticut Law Review (2007) 1739 and A Beckers, Enforcing 
Corporate Social Responsibility Codes (Oxford, 2015).  
14 For the text, see Bangladesh Accord on Building and Fire Safety, available at http://bangladeshaccord.org (last 
visited 7 January 2016). For an analysis, cf. M Anner, J Bair & J Blasi, ‘Toward Joint Liability in Global Supply 
Chains: Addressing the Root Causes of Labor Violations in International Subcontracting Networks’ 35 Compar-
ative Labor Law and Policy Journal (2013) 1 and B ter Haar & M Keune, ‘One Step Forward or More Window-
Dressing? A Legal Analysis of Recent CSR Initiatives in the Garment Industry in Bangladesh’ 30 International 
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations (2014) 5.  
15 Cf. G Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’, in G Teubner (ed.), Global Law 
Without a State (Dartmouth, 1997), 3 and PS Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond 
Borders (Cambridge UP, 2012). For an illustration from the global toy industry, cf. F Snyder, The EU, the WTO 
and China: Legal Pluralism and International Trade Regulation (Hart, 2010) 44-88.    
16 See, e.g., E Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory (Inklinks, 1978) [1924] 37-45 (arguing that the 
very form of law follows the commodity form); P Ireland, ‘History, Critical Legal Studies and the Mysterious 
Disappearance of Capitalism’ 65 The Modern Law Review (2002) 120; C Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A 
Marxist Theory of International Law (Pluto, 2005); G Baars, ‘Reform or Revolution: Marxian vs Polanyian ap-
proaches to the regulation of “the economic”’ 17 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly (2011) 415.  
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production regimes,17 and institutional views explore the reciprocal relation between chain 
structures and regulatory strategies essentially as a matter of choice,18 the role of law in GVCs 
foregrounds questions of power and distribution. At the same time, a comprehensive analysis 
of law in GVCs would harness tools developed by contemporary socio-legal19 and pluralist20 
inquiries into law. Our investigation of law and global production shares much with legal work 
that questions the territorial and statist preoccupations of legal regimes and questions the sep-
aration of economic activity from political contestation. Hence, the tension between a territorial 
logic of law and the transnational logic of capital as it is expressed in GVCs becomes produc-
tive in nature. Theorising the constitutive role of the present legal landscape in the proliferation 
of GVCs thus immediately invites reflections on the adequacy of this legal paradigm, both at 
the conceptual level and at the level of legal reform. It is in this sense that GVCs appear as a 
salient and highly topical field of research for contemporary critical legal scholarship.  
 
 
DEVELOPING A CRITICAL LEGAL APPROACH TO GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: 
INITIAL RESEARCH PROJECTS 
 
The research agenda developed by the IGLP Law and Global Production working group pro-
ceeds from our collective sense that GVCs take a peculiar shape provoked by the incongruity 
between the apparent territoriality of the law and the transnational logic of capital. Through 
this collective research effort, we hope to better understand how the legal landscape is negoti-
ated and exploited by firms, both in their relationships with the state and with other firms. In 
short, we aim to heed Dan Danielsen’s call to ‘study the ways in which this form of [GVC] 
capitalism impacts relations among firms and states as individual firms and the chain as a whole 
                                                 
17 Cf. G Teubner, ‘Idiosyncratic Production Regimes’, in J Ziman (ed.), The Evolution of Cultural Entities (Oxford 
UP, 2002) 161 (using evolutionary theory to explain institutional divergence in the law of just-in-time manufac-
turing and leasing).  
18 Cf., e.g., F Cafaggi & P Iamiceli, ‘Private Regulation and Industrial Organization: Contractual Governance and 
the Network Approach’, in S Grundmann, F Möslein & K Riesenhuber (eds), Contract Governance (Oxford UP 
2015) 343.  
19 See, e.g., C Tan, ‘Navigating new landscapes. Socio-legal mapping of plurality and power in international eco-
nomic law’, in Perry-Kessaris (ed.) (2013) 19.  
20 Cf. Teubner (1997); Berman (2012); B de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globali-
zation and Emancipation, 2nd ed. (Cambridge UP, 2004); and, recently, H Dedek & S van Praagh (eds), Stateless 
Law. Evolving Boundaries of a Discipline (Ashgate, 2015). 
This is the pre-publication ‘final author accepted’ version of the article that will appear in the 
London Review of International Law, Volume 4 Issue 1 March 2016. 
8 
navigate and transform the multiple states, regulators and legal regimes with which they inter-
act in the pursuit of their business objectives . . . and to broaden our notions of political econ-
omy to encompass the multiplicity of firm/state relations that global value chains entail’.21 
 
To study the extent and implications of the mutual dependence and co-evolution of law and 
GVCs, members of the Law and Global Production Working Group have initiated projects that 
illuminate some of the ways in which our research questions and methods can be pursued. 
These projects cluster along three broad themes: the legal geography of GVCs; the relation 
between law, value and bargaining power in GVCs; and, the role of law in GVC governance. 
In the remainder of this manifesto, we provide an overview of these overarching themes using 
examples from group members’ projects where appropriate to suggest how these themes might 
begin to be productively explored.  
 
Legal geography of GVCs 
 
The creation and operation of GVCs involve immense complexity in terms of the legal norms, 
tools and institutions involved. This complexity is multi-layered, and has both organisational 
and geographic dimensions. Accordingly, it will be crucial to develop techniques to study these 
phenomena in ways that illustrate the particularity of diverse legal and GVC structures, while 
remaining cognisant of the broader complexity of the contexts in which these structures oper-
ate. For this reason, we focus here on mapping the legal geography of GVCs as a vital sub-
field in our broader research field of law and global structures of production.  
 
It is by mapping the legal geography of GVCs that we can show what the traditional division 
of law into discrete sub-fields misses or conceals, and how domestic, international hard and 
soft law and private ordering mechanisms intermingle in ways that challenge efforts to main-
tain clear distinctions between them. At the same time, mapping can help make visible the 
constitutive role of law to non-legal scholars. 
 
                                                 
21 D Danielsen, ‘Beyond Corporate Governance: Why a new Approach to the Study of Corporate Law is needed 
to Address Global Inequality and Economic Development’, in U Mattei & JD Haskell (eds), Research Handbook 
on Political Economy and Law (Edward Elgar, 2015) 195.  
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To get a sense of what such a mapping project could entail, consider a hypothetical multina-
tional corporation (MNC) of the type that is, according to the UNCTAD report cited above,22 
shaping 80 per cent of world trade. In organising their productive activities, MNCs first face 
the classic ‘make versus buy’ decision. These options already point in the direction of two 
different traditionally demarcated fields of law—corporate law for the institutional form 
through which business is conducted, and contract law for the interface between legal entities. 
If the firm decides to make the product abroad, it must also decide where to locate its subsidi-
ary, perhaps provoking a comparison of the domestic laws and enforcement practices of con-
tending and competing potential host countries, as well as the relative impact on those hosts’ 
applicable trade, investment, and intellectual property rules. By contrast, a ‘buy’ decision from 
a foreign supplier may implicate international commercial law, various public and private in-
dustry standards, international commercial arbitration rules, or domestic dispute resolution re-
gimes, as well as the domestic contract law of both the MNC’s and the foreign supplier’s home 
jurisdictions. 
 
This radically simplified example becomes all the more complex when we consider that diverse 
forms of productive activity will involve multiple kinds of law, and different business actors 
pursuing the same business activity may make different choices based on their assessment of 
the legal and economic terrain with which they seek to engage and the distributive effects they 
seek to achieve. Such choices will have significant impact on firms’ bargaining power, for 
example, and exposure to commercial risk. 
 
Or, to take another example, organising global production through networks of independent 
firms that coordinate exchanges via contract rather than ownership might have as much to do 
with mitigating tort or other legal liability risks and the degree of enforcement in a particular 
locale as it does with economic productivity.23 A firm makes decisions on where to site pro-
duction based on a mixture of factors such as the legal requirements it will face, how likely it 
is that such requirements will be policed and enforced by public authorities, as well as an as-
sessment of the likelihood that labour unions, or other external forces such as social move-
ments, NGOs, or public interest lawyers, may challenge its actions. Of course, the relative 
                                                 
22 Cf. Milberg & Winkler (2013); UNCTAD (2013); Cowen (2014).  
23 Cf. A Ruhmkorf, Corporate Social Responsibility, Private Law and Global Supply Chains (Edward Elgar, 
2015); P Rott & V Ulfbeck, ‘Supply Chain Liability of Multinational Corporations?’ 23 European Review of 
Private Law (2015) 415; M Conway, ‘A New Duty of Care? Tort Liability from Voluntary Human Rights Due 
Diligence in Global Supply Chains’ 40 Queen’s Law Journal (2015) 741. 
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significance of particular legal regimes on the organisation and operation of particular chains 
will vary and is ultimately an empirical question.  
 
Within our working group, initial efforts at mapping the legal geographies of GVCs have fo-
cused on extractive industries.  This is because some group members have found that the ways 
in which such industries are often, though not always, rooted in particular jurisdictions offer 
particular insights into the articulations of law in global value chains. First, soil and mineral 
resources form the bases of the production networks of all goods and services, beginning with 
the food that fuels human labour, and the energy that drives global production and powers 
global transportation. Second, natural resource industries have immense global (geo)political 
significance. The firms engaged in these industries are among the largest in the world24 and the 
geo-politics of resource extraction shape intimately the inter-state system, most prominently in 
the case of hydrocarbon resources. Finally, extractives are not only profoundly important to 
international trade; they are also critical for socio-economic development, especially in the 
global South. Law plays a central role in structuring the conditions under which such resources 
are accessed, traded, extracted, monetised and consumed.25 Legal systems also critically shape 
the distributive dynamics—and conflicts over—the value produced in these global value 
chains.  
  
As in all sectors, in extractive industries, multiple interest groups, including multinational 
firms, states, and labour, seek to extract various kinds of wealth from the global value chains 
of which they are a part, while conservation and human rights groups seek to structure chains 
in ways that they believe improve the ecological and human condition. Several projects explore 
the role of law and legal regimes in ordering these contests in extractive sectors. For example, 
Liam Campling and Elizabeth Havice illustrate how interlocking and sometimes contradictory 
global, regional, and national legal systems combine with the material features of highly mi-
gratory fisheries to shape the geographies of extraction, production, and consumption in the 
global tuna industry. Jesse Salah Ovadia explores the role of local content policies26 in lever-
aging the unique nature of the petroleum value chain in ‘upgrading’ schemes that create the 
                                                 
24 Cf. G Bridge, ‘Global Production Networks and the Extractive Sector: Governing Resource-Based Develop-
ment’ 8 Journal of Economic Geography (2008) 389. 
25 Cf. L Campling & E Havice, ‘The Problem of Property in Industrial Fisheries’ 41 The Journal of Peasant 
Studies (2014) 707.  
26 JS Ovadia, ‘Local Content and Natural Resource Governance: The Cases of Angola and Nigeria’ 1 The Extrac-
tive Industries and Society (2014) 137. 
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possibility of what he calls ‘the petro-developmental state’,27 while Lucie E. White is working 
with a team of law students and scholars to analyse how political contests over Ghana’s petro-
leum revenue management priorities are embedded in the intricacies of its petroleum manage-
ment laws. These debates over national petro-spending priorities are in turn nested within geo-
political contests over whether Ghana’s extraction rents should be (re)distributed at local, na-
tional, or supra-national levels. Each response to this geo-political question is configured 
through a different nexus of laws. By integrating critical legal scholarship and GVC analysis, 
the projects seek to explore nodes of power in extractive industries and bring attention to prom-
inent policy questions, especially around intersecting questions of materiality, geopolitics, and 
‘development’. 
 
Law, value and power  
 
A second theme that merits serious scholarly attention is the role of law in the creation, recog-
nition, and distribution of value among actors in GVCs, as well as the relationship between 
legal entitlements and bargaining power in chain structures. In particular, we believe a focus 
on the constitutive role of law in the production process and in the economy poses serious 
challenges for notions of ‘value’ and ‘value-added’ commonly held by scholars of GVCs. 
 
In most ‘orthodox’ or policy-oriented literature on GVCs, value is defined as ‘value-added’—
that is, simply the value of the output at each link minus the value of inputs. The assumption 
underlying this metric is that some value is added at each successive stage in the chain. How-
ever because the amount of value-added may vary significantly from link to link, the benefits 
of participating in the chain are often unevenly distributed.28  
 
For mainstream GVC analysts, ‘value added’ is the recognition, in economic terms, of produc-
tive innovation. Innovation generates new products and/or processes, which, when protected 
by barriers to entry, generate Schumpeterian profits, or what Kaplinsky29 refers to as ‘rent’. 
This concept of value-added underlies much of the appeal of the GVC framework. For firms it 
                                                 
27 JS Ovadia, The Petro-Developmental State in Africa: Making Oil Work in Angola, Nigeria and the Gulf of 
Guinea (Hurst & Co., 2015).  
28 J Dedrick, KL Kraemer & G Linden, ‘Who profits from innovation in global value chains? A study of the iPod 
and notebook PCs’ 19 Industrial and Corporate Change (2010) 81. 
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provides a straightforward prescription—create proprietary innovations.  For developing coun-
tries, it suggests a policy imperative—encourage not just innovation, but the integration of 
firms into those global chains which provide the best returns on innovation. This process of 
“moving up the value chain,” or capturing an ever greater share of the value generated along 
it, is described in the GVC literature as ‘upgrading’.30 
 
While, at an intuitive level, value-added through upgrading in GVCs may seem a straightfor-
ward proposition, researchers face multiple practical and conceptual difficulties in accessing, 
systematising, and measuring relevant data on value and value-adding processes.31 Some de-
velopment scholars have questioned the implications of firm-level upgrading for workers or its 
consequences more broadly for the processes of productivity growth and (human) capital for-
mation traditionally associated with macro-level development.32 Recent work has even tried to 
expand the concept of firm-level upgrading, beyond a narrow focus on value-added, to incor-
porate a ‘social upgrading’ dimension that addresses the quantity and quality of employment 
generated at particular links in a value chain.33 These efforts reveal underlying tensions around 
this notion of value and the application of GVC thinking in its pursuit. Yet, these tensions have 
not, thus far, led to a conceptual reassessment among most GVC scholars of ‘value’ and ‘value-
added’. 
 
We have found that bringing critical legal insights to the analysis of the production and distri-
bution of value in chain structures opens a range of new avenues for promising research. Fol-
lowing in the tradition of Robert Hale, Morris Cohen, Duncan Kennedy, David Kennedy and 
other critical legal theorists, scholars have long recognised that legal entitlements impact the 
relative power of social actors, and as a consequence, the distribution of present and future 
                                                 
30 G Gereffi, ‘International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity chain’ 48 Journal of Interna-
tional Economics (1999) 37; P Gibbon, ‘Upgrading primary production: A global commodity chain approach’ 29 
World Development (2001) 345. 
31 Cf. TJ Sturgeon, P B Nielsen, G Linden, G Gereffi & C Brown, ‘Direct measurement of global value chains: 
collecting product- and firm-level statistics on value added and business function outsourcing and offshoring’, in 
A Mattoo et al. (eds), Trade in Value Added: Developing New Measures of Cross-Border Rrade (World Bank, 
2013) 289.  
32 Cf. Milberg & Winkler (2013); F Palpacuer, ‘Bringing the Social Context Back In: Governance and Wealth 
Distribution in Global Commodity Chains’ 37 Economy and Society (2008) 393; B Selwyn, Workers, State and 
Development in Brazil: Powers of Labour, Chains of Value (Manchester UP, 2012); J Heintz, ‘Low-wage manu-
facturing and global commodity chains: a model in the unequal exchange tradition’ 20 Cambridge Journal of 
Economics (2006) 507. 
33 S Barrientos, G Gereffi & A Rossi, ‘Economic and social upgrading in global production networks: A new 
paradigm for a changing world’ 150 International Labour Review (2012) 319.  
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resources among such actors.34 The most accessible example of this insight might be a property 
entitlement that gives one actor the right to exclude all others from use of the subject’s property. 
If the resource to which the property right attaches is something others need, the right holder 
will have the power to demand concessions from the others to gain access to it. If access to the 
thing is crucial to the others’ survival, the right holder’s power to extract concessions may 
extend to complete servitude by the others. By contrast, if the property is of relatively little use 
to the others or access to similar property is readily available, the ability to exact concessions 
for its use will be accordingly more limited. At a simple level, a focus on legal entitlements 
can help clarify how the ‘value’ in a GVC is distributed among the actors participating in it, 
while also focusing attention on numerous background legal regimes that undergird and struc-
ture market ordering in the first instance.  
 
To be clear, we see the relationship between law and value as more than a matter of how value 
is distributed. Our research agenda calls for opening the ‘black box’ of value-added in order to 
interrogate, more precisely, what role the law might play in the production of value. As a group 
we acknowledge—but don’t claim to resolve—the theoretical tensions among us and the or-
thodox approach to GVCs with regard to the question of value. Such tensions, for instance, 
reside ineluctably at the interface between the Marxian theory of value, Schumpeterian con-
ception of rents, and Hale-ian analysis of coercion and bargaining power. We recognise this 
tension because we have found it a source of intellectual energy that enriches understanding 
and that is preferable to neat formulations that gloss over internal theoretical inconsistencies.35  
 
Despite these theoretical tensions, it is a shared interest in how power-laden social relations 
construct systems of production, exchange, and distribution that has allowed the legal scholars 
among us to talk so effectively with the political economists and sociologists. More specifi-
cally, we share a common interest in the following kinds of questions.  What role does law play 
                                                 
34 Cf. R Hale, ‘Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State’ 38 Political Science Quarterly 
(1923) 470. See also M Cohen, ‘Property and Sovereignty’ 13 Cornell Law Review (1927) 8; Duncan Kennedy, 
A Critique of Adjudication (fin de siècle) (Harvard UP, 1998); David Kennedy, ‘Some caution about property 
rights as a recipe for economic development’ 1 Accounting, Economics, and Law (2011) 1.  
35 One such inconsistency can be found in the GPN literature of the so-called Manchester school of economic 
geography. Falling within the broad domain of GVC studies, the GPN (or Global Production Network) approach 
also investigates questions of value, but within this collectively-authored body of work, there is no explicit dis-
cussion or recognition of the fact that a (class-relational) Marxian theory of surplus value is melded with a tech-
nical-economic theory of rent. Cf. J Henderson, P Dicken, M Hess, N Coe & H Wai-Chung Yeung, ‘Global 
production networks and the analysis of economic development’ 9 Review of International Political Economy 
(2002) 436. 
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in creating barriers to entry at particular links in the chain, and thus in creating and protecting 
rents? How do legal dynamics with regard to the appropriation of rent influence how chains 
are organised, including their geographic configuration? Since legal entitlements shape the rel-
ative bargaining power of actors to extract concessions from each other, in what way do 
changes in legal entitlements affect the distribution of bargaining power and hence the distri-
bution of resources? What tools (legal and otherwise) enable which actors to define what con-
stitutes value and/or reshape the conditions under which it is generated and distributed?  
 
Issues of legal entitlements and their role in the creation and distribution of value pervade 
GVCs, including tax law, IP law, labour law and the plethora of legal structures that have 
enabled financialisation.36 For example, the ubiquitous practice of tax structuring for the pur-
pose of maximising post-tax profitability brings into stark relief how the existence, recognition, 
and location of value may be as much a function of legal rules as production processes.37 Or as 
an example from intellectual property law reveals, multinational pharmaceutical companies 
have been able to maintain higher prices globally for their patented drugs under the post-TRIPs 
global patent regime than under the previous nationally divergent patent regimes that allowed 
India, Brazil, Egypt, and other nations to develop competing drugs based on identical pharma-
ceutical compounds.38 While one might debate the economic or moral justifications for this 
change in global patent regulation, its impact on the legal distribution of value among pharma-
ceutical producers and nations around the world is indisputable. 
 
Labour law is practically defined by questions of value. Thinking through labour law vis-à-vis 
GVCs opens space for rethinking value and value-added processes. For example, looking at 
the variegated application of law across a single value chain could spur research into, for ex-
ample, the ‘low’ value-added attributed to low-wage workers in export processing zones and 
the ways that the ‘value’ that these workers ‘add’ is constrained, in part, by legal limitations 
on the scope of productive activities permissible in the zones (such as, for example, limiting 
                                                 
36 Cf. P Miller & M Power, ‘Accounting, organizing, and economizing: connecting accounting research and or-
ganization theory’ 7 The Academy of Management Annals (2013) 557. 
37 Cf. recently A Cobham & P Jansky, ‘Measuring Misalignment: the Location of US Multinationals’ Economic 
Activity Versus the Location of their Profits’, ICTD Working Paper 42 (Nov 2015), available at 
http://www.ictd.ac/publications (last visited 7 January 2016).  
38 Cf. for different country studies H Löfgren & OW Williams (eds), The Palgrave Macmillan New Political 
Economy of Pharmaceuticals. Production, Innovation and TRIPS in the Global South (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 
and generally M Carolan, ‘Making Patents and Intellectual Property Work. The Asymmetrical “Harmonization” 
of TRIPS’ 21 Organization & Environment (2008) 295.  
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workers in the zones to processing imported foreign inputs for re-export and prohibiting the 
formation of trade unions and/or collective bargaining).39 Or how the value produced by work-
ers in one part of a value chain may be limited by firms elsewhere in the chain, and the ways 
in which legal control over certain key elements in the production chain, such as intellectual 
property, may enhance a firm’s power over other parts of the chain. It also opens space for 
analysis of how the right to organise, the right to strike, and the right to protest against unsafe 
and exploitative working conditions, and a resulting ability for workers to command higher 
wages, might affect not just the value they ‘add’ to the production process, but also the distri-
bution of that value in terms of the amount that they capture.  Similarly, apparently non-legal 
pricing practices of powerful buyers in one part of a chain may produce significant effects on 
the existence or enforcement of labour standards in other parts of the chain. 40 This discussion 
of labour highlights the many ways in which what might seem identifiable as ‘economic’ or 
‘legal’ factors interact dynamically making attributions of which factor is producing what ef-
fect hard to discern.  At the same time, recognising that differences in bargaining power among 
chain actors may be as much a function of legal and policy choices as of ‘market forces’, sug-
gests that different legal or policy choices could produce profoundly different (and perhaps 
much more equitable) distributions of power and rents across the chain.  
 
Important additional insights into the relationship between law and value can be found in ex-
ploring finance in the context of GVCs.  For example, although the impact of financialisation 
on the globalisation of production is widely acknowledged, there is surprisingly little research 
on the significance of financialisation on the creation or destruction of value within GVCs.41 
Since legal systems (or the arbitrage of gaps in or among legal systems) often define the pa-
rameters of risk and reward in financial structures,42 some members of our research group are 
focusing on the role of financial capital and finance law in structuring global value chains, and, 
                                                 
39 Cf. on these dynamics C Hennig, ‘Free Trade Zones/Export Processing Zones’, in DT Cook & JM Ryan (eds), 
The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Consumption and Consumer Studies (Wiley Blackwell, 2015) 310.  
40 See M Anner, J Bair & J Blasi (2012); C Dolan, ‘On farm and packhouse: Employment at the bottom of a global 
value chain’ 69 Rural Sociology (2004) 99. 
41 Cf. W Milberg, ‘Shifting sources and uses of profits: sustaining US financialisation with global value chains’ 
37 Economy and Society (2008) 420. For a synopsis of the phenomenon, cf. G Epstein, ‘Financialization and the 
World Economy’, in G Epstein (ed.), Financialisation and the World Economy (Edward Elgar, 2005) 3. 
42 See, e.g., for a discussion of shareholder activism in labour law S Jacoby, ‘Finance and Labor: Perspectives on 
Risk, Inequality, and Democracy’ 30 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal (2008) 17 and B Rogers, ‘Com-
plexities of Shareholder Primacy: A Response to Sanford Jacoby’ 30 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 
(2008) 95.  
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conversely, on how GVCs impact and/or undermine systems of financial regulation.43 For ex-
ample, Liam Campling and David Quentin draw on Marx’s theory of value to support their 
argument that financial flows resulting from GVC structures and disparate tax systems re-en-
force global inequalities between firms, countries, classes and genders, as well as how these 
inequities might be alleviated through tax reform at the national and the transnational levels. 
In another project, Tomaso Ferrando is analysing recent reports on the financialisation of food 
chains and the effect of financial crises on food security in the global South44 in order to explore 
how law is implicated in creating or permitting recent food shortages. 
 
It seems important to note that law is not only relevant to issues of value and power when it is 
directed expressly to the sphere of market exchange.  For example, family law regimes and 
gender norms shape the distribution of labour market opportunities as well as how unpaid re-
productive labour is performed.45 Welfare regimes enable workers to enter or exit the labour 
market and help determine workers’ bargaining power vis-à-vis employers and each other. 
Permissive and restrictive norms surrounding the treatment of ethnic, racial, and religious 
groupings establish hierarchies of access that structure the ability of these groups to create and 
extract ‘value’ through participation in GVCs.46 
 
                                                 
43 Development policy and practice at the international financial institutions represents one potentially interesting 
research topic along these lines, particularly with regard to the possible intersection of the GVC turn in develop-
ment policy—cf. M Werner, J Bair & VR Fernández, ‘Linking Up to Development? Global Value Chains and the 
Making of a Post-Washington Consensus’ 45 Development and Change (2014) 1219 and J Neilson, ‘Global Value 
Chains, Neoliberalism and Development Practice: The Indonesian Experience’ 21 Review of International Polit-
ical Economy (2014) 38—and the emphasis on ‘financial development’ as a central plank of the contemporary 
international development agenda—cf. S Soederberg, ‘The Emperor's New Suit: The New International Financial 
Architecture as a Reinvention of the Washington Consensus’ 7 Global Governance (2001) 453. 
44 Cf., e.g., L Russi & T Ferrando, ‘“Capitalism A Nuh’ Wi Frien”: The Formatting of Farming into an Asset, 
from Financial Speculation to International Aid’ 6 Catalyst, A Social Justice Forum (2015), available at 
http://trace.tennessee.edu/catalyst/ (last visited 7 January 2016); L Russi, Hungry Capital: The Financialization 
of Food (Zero Books, 2013); Oxfam, ‘Don’t gamble with food. How the German financial industry is making a 
business out of hunger’ (2011), available at https://www.oxfam.de/sites/www.oxfam.de/files/englische_zusam-
menfassung_final.pdf (last visited 7 January 2016); S Murphy, D Burch & J Clapp, ‘Cereal Secrets: The world’s 
largest grain traders and global agriculture’, Oxfam Report (August 2012), available at 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr-cereal-secrets-grain-traders-agriculture-30082012-en.pdf 
(last visited 7 January 2016).  
45 S Barrientos, ‘Gendered Global Production Networks: Analysis of Cocoa-Chocolate Sourcing’ 48 Regional 
Studies (2014) 791; M Werner, ‘Beyond Upgrading: Gendered Labor and the Restructuring of Firms in the Do-
minican Republic’ 88 Economic Geography (2012) 403.   
46 M Carr & M Chen, ‘Globalization, social exclusion and gender’ 143 International Labour Review (2004) 129; 
M Werner & J Bair, ‘Commodity Chains and the Uneven Geographies of Global Capitalism: A disarticulations 
perspective’ 43 Environment and Planning (2011) 988. 
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Finally, it is also significant that law can impact GVCs both by what it permits or omits as well 
as what it affirmatively requires.  As has been discussed, a lack of legal entitlements (such as 
property rights or a right to organise), the absence of formal regulation, a policy or practice of 
selective or non-enforcement, or a failure to enforce may be as powerful in shaping the behav-
iour of firms or the welfare of particular chain actors as formal rules regularly enforced.47 
Moreover, the decision by a state not to regulate or enforce a legal rule (for example, a local 
content requirement) may result from an effort to comply with another conflicting legal obli-
gation (such as a bi-lateral investment treaty or a trade agreement).48 Law shapes power and 
value, both by when it seems to be acting and when it appears to be absent. 
 
In sum, the ways in which law creates and distributes value and bargaining power are numerous 
and pervasive. We have found a focus on these dynamics in GVCs to be particularly fruitful 
both for enhancing our understanding of the background legal norms that are shaping the rela-
tive bargaining positions of actors in the global economy, as well as of the relative ability of 
such actors to participate in chain structures or to capture an equitable share of chain surplus.  
This strand of law and GVC research also seems important in helping to identify which legal 
and policy tools might be most useful to shift power and resources more equitable across 
chains.    
 
Law and GVC governance 
 
In GVC literature, governance refers to the process of coordinating the relationships among 
actors at different links in a value chain and it has been a core preoccupation of the GVC 
literature.49 Ponte and Sturgeon explain that ‘[t]he idea of governance in GVCs rests on the 
assumption that, while both disintegration of production and its re-integration through inter-
firm trade have recognizable dynamics, they do not occur spontaneously . . . . Instead these 
processes are “driven” by the strategies and decisions of specific actors. The relevance of GVC 
                                                 
47 Cf. A Santos & D Trubek (eds), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge 
UP, 2006); A Santos, ‘Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform and Economic Development’ 50 Virginia Journal of In-
ternational Law (2009) 43. 
48 E.g. K Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science’, in C Brown 
& K Miles (eds), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge UP, 2011) 606. 
49 On the narrower meaning of ‘governance’ in the legal discourse and generally on the competing interpretations, 
cf. Zumbansen (2012). 
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governance is that it examines the concrete practices, power dynamics, and organizational 
forms that give character and structure to cross-border business networks’.50 
 
Gereffi’s original formulation of governance in what were then called commodity chains iden-
tified both a ‘producer-driven’ logic and a ‘buyer-driven’ logic.51 The criterion for differenti-
ating between buyer-driven and producer-driven chains was who had the power to control the 
organisation of activities and the distribution of value along the chain: manufacturers (i.e. those 
who make) or retailers (i.e. those who buy). Subsequent literature shifted towards a concern 
with how governance was exercised and why it takes the form that it does.52 At a general level, 
then, the primary focus of governance within the GVC literature has been elaborating typolo-
gies of, and developing explanations for, the ways in which coordination is achieved in geo-
graphically dispersed and organisationally fragmented production networks.  
 
While the insights of GVC scholars on lead firms and their role in chain governance tell us 
much, we are only at the beginning of understanding law’s role in GVC governance. More 
research is needed in order to better understand the circumstances under which firms assume 
chain coordinating functions, and in particular, about the tools (legal or otherwise) at their 
disposal for carrying out those functions. Because although the assumption of coordinating 
functions may be motivated by technical or managerial imperatives or pressure from competi-
tors or consumers, not surprisingly, it may also result from legal regulation or arbitrage. A 
research focus on law and the distribution of power among chain actors is important not only 
with regard to developing a richer analysis of the mechanisms through which value is created 
                                                 
50 Cf. S Ponte & T Sturgeon, ‘Explaining governance in global value chains: A modular theory-building effort’ 
21 Review of International Political Economy (2014) 195, 200.  
51 G Gereffi, ‘The organization of buyer-driven global commodity chains: How U.S. retailers shape overseas pro-
duction networks’, in G Gereffi & M Korzeniewicz (eds), Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism (Praeger, 
1994) 95.  
52 The GVC literature now offers multiple conceptualisations of governance; some conceive it as sector-wide 
patterns of coordination that are produced by specific industry-level characteristics: see, e.g., G Gereffi, J Humph-
rey & T Sturgeon, ‘The governance of global value chains’ 12 Review of International Political Economy (2005) 
78; T Sturgeon, ‘Modular production networks. A new American model of industrial organization’ 11 Industrial 
and Corporate Change (2002) 451. Others draw from convention theory, arguing that diverse forms of govern-
ance can be found within an industry because multiple conceptualisations of quality can be used to justify or 
distinguish products in the market: cf. L Boltanski & L Thévenot, On Justification: Economies of Worth (Prince-
ton UP, 2006) and S Ponte & P Gibbon, ‘Quality Standards, Conventions and the Governance of Global Value 
Chains’ 34 Economy and Society (2005) 1. Still others continue to find the most analytical value in the producer-
driven and buyer-driven distinction, even as the proportion of value-adding activities conducted outside the or-
ganisational boundaries of the lead firm are increasing in the more capital-intensive, manufacturer-centred indus-
tries associated with producer-driven governance. 
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and rent captured, but also for the purpose of elaborating the means through which chain ac-
tivities are, or could be, coordinated and controlled. 
 
A central plank of this research project is to examine the legal (as well as commercial) mech-
anisms through which coordination and control are exercised among actors within chains. For 
example, why do some chain actors coordinate some relationships through ownership and oth-
ers through contract? A Coasian analysis highlighting the incentive structure set by transaction 
costs53 suggests that the consolidated firm is necessary when the transaction costs of efficient 
coordination of independent economic actors through contract are too high. More recent firm 
theory focuses attention on controlling the agency costs associated with the monitoring and 
control of management by owners.54 One might expect that agency costs associated with coor-
dination and monitoring of large, globally disaggregated GVCs might be quite high. What legal 
mechanisms help to reconcile these costs and tensions in GVCs? In the absence of any sover-
eign with jurisdiction over the GVC, or any system of law binding on the GVC as a whole and 
each of its constituent actors, how are norms of coordination and behaviour transnationalised 
through the chain?  
 
For example, four of the five types of governance proposed by Gereffi, Humphrey and Stur-
geon in their influential theory of GVC governance—market, relational, captive, and modu-
lar—fall under the broad category of contract.55 To what extent are legal conceptions of con-
tract, built within national frameworks, able to accommodate multiple, legally independent ac-
tors in networked but not necessarily arm’s length relationships with one another? Might sup-
plier contracts, for instance, provide the legal basis for liability for actors across the chain? 56 
To what extent are current conceptions of contract able to evolve in order to deal with the 
public and regulatory functions that lead firms exercise, and sometimes delegate?57 How does 
                                                 
53 Cf. R Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ 4 Economica (1937) 386 (suggesting markets and firms as competing 
model types in the organisation of production).  
54 See, e.g., J Armour, H Hansmann & R Kraakman, ‘Agency Problems and Legal Strategies’, in R Kraakman et 
al. (eds), The Anatomy of Corporate Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford UP, 2009) 35.  
55 Cf. Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon (2005). 
56 See J Salminen, ‘Contract Boundary Spanning Governance Mechanisms: Conceptualizing Fragmented and 
Globalized Production as Collectively Governed Entities’ forthcoming in 23 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies (2016) (using comparative law insights to establish a transnational discourse in law and value chain gov-
ernance which goes beyond national conceptualisations of contract and tort). 
57 Suggestions acknowledging the public and regulatory function of contracts include relational contracting—cf. 
as locus classicus S Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ 28 American Soci-
ological Review (1963) 1 and I Macneil, ‘Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries’ 94 Northwestern 
University Law Review (2000) 877—as well as, more recently, ‘contract networks’—cf. G Teubner, Networks as 
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law affect who has the ability to set the terms of exchange in a GVC? And which legal forum 
has authority to adjudicate disputes arising either between participants in the GVC or between 
participants and third parties external to the GVC?58 Or even more fundamentally what distin-
guishes a GVC from a series of disarticulated commercial (or market) transactions and what is 
the role of law in the distinction? 
 
Several projects have been initiated by members of our group around the theme of law and 
governance. In one, Jennifer Bair, Jason Jackson, and Brishen Rogers trace the emergence of 
a new form of labour regulation that they identify as ‘supply chain liability’. Prior private reg-
ulatory efforts such as transnational tort litigation and unilateral codes of conduct laid the 
groundwork for such new legal regimes, but states have begun to push beyond the limitations 
of norm-based governance. For example, Israel, the Netherlands, and various states within the 
US have begun to hold domestic firms jointly liable for their overseas contractors’ and suppli-
ers’ labour law violations. While those laws are embedded in national legal systems, and ac-
cordingly vary in many ways, they share a common core: they establish a duty of care rooted 
in tort doctrines requiring party A to prevent party B from causing harms to party C. Bair, 
Jackson and Rogers examine the degree to which the legal logics underlying this emergent 
regulatory form rest on claims about the nature of lead firm governance in specific GVCs and 
its effects. Specifically, they suggest three dimensions which they believe will prove critical 
for developing the jurisprudence of supply chain liability:  the specific labour practices for 
which lead firms should be responsible; what standards of liability should apply so as to dif-
ferentiate firms based upon their capacity to ensure decent work and whether those standards 
should vary based upon the geographic location of production work; and provisions for private 
or public enforcement, whether in domestic or new transnational tribunals.  
 
                                                 
Connected Contracts (Hart, 2011)—‘organisational contracts’—cf. S Grundmann, F Cafaggi & G Vettori (eds), 
The Organizational Contract. From Exchange to Long-Term Network Cooperation in European Contract Law 
(Ashgate, 2013)—and ‘contracting for innovation’—cf. R Gilson, C Sabel & R Scott, ‘Contracting for Innovation: 
Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration’ 109 Columbia Law Review (2009) 431.  
58 Legal scholarship on international commercial arbitration, for example, thus far almost completely fails to rec-
ognise or analyse the origins and deeper effects of variance in bargaining power, treating disputing parties as 
formal legal equals despite vast material differences. Cf. G Baars, The Corporation, Law and Capitalism (Brill, 
forthcoming); K Amaeshi, O Kingsley Osuji & P Nnodim, ‘Corporate Control and Accountability in supply chains 
of Multinational Corporations: Clarifications and Managerial Implications’, ICCSR Research Paper No. 46-2007, 
available at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/ICCSR/research.php?action=download&id=34, last visited 7 
January 2016.  
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Additional projects by Dez Farkas and Jaakko Salminen explore the theme of law and govern-
ance through contract. Dez Farkas’s project draws on examples from the recent financial crisis 
and the electronics sector and uses recent developments in corporate governance to interrogate 
the structural and distributional dimensions of GVCs and their underlying assumptions of 
value. His project pays particular attention to how complex inter-firm relations, often linked 
by contract alone, can undermine efforts to hold domestic firms liable for violations by the 
foreign affiliates over whom they exercise governance, and explores the legal mechanisms that 
enable internal firm governance to influence other value chain actors.  
 
Jaakko Salminen’s work involves bringing together research in global value chain governance 
with research into the legal mechanisms used for governing complex contractual structures. 
Turning towards comparative law, this project aims to elaborate a transnational discourse on 
law and value chain governance that transcends different national conceptualisations of con-
tract, tort, and other relevant legal relationships.  
 
From here we can see that law is not, or not only, an exogenous factor that firms confront in 
making decisions about where and how to do business, nor can it be reduced to an external 
force that ‘guides’, ‘drives’, ‘pulls’ and ‘pushes’ the value chain. This is because, while the 
legal environment undoubtedly shapes firm-level decisions, the large corporations that coordi-
nate many of the most expansive and consequential GVCs are not simply ‘context-takers’. 
They also help to produce the rules that govern their operations through, among other things, 
the pursuit of their business objectives. 
 
In his work on transnational corporations, Dan Danielsen has sought to catalogue some of the 
ways in which corporate actors create and shape local, national, regional and transnational legal 
regimes.  He states: 
 
Sometimes [corporations] contribute through interpretations of or reactions to a legal 
rules scheme.  Sometimes they supply rules where none exist.  Sometimes they shape 
a rule scheme through direct political or economic pressure on regulators.  Sometimes 
they shape it by evading the rule scheme and doing business elsewhere.   Sometimes to 
satisfy other business purposes they adopt more stringent practices than the applicable 
rules require.  Sometimes they act on their own to get a market edge or exploit an op-
portunity.  Sometimes they act in groups to create a harmonized regulatory environment 
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or to prevent regulation.  These diverse forms of corporate actions and decisions are 
related to the applicable legal rules and the acts and decisions of regulators, but are not 
wholly determined by them.  When corporations create or shape the content, interpre-
tation, efficacy, or enforcement of legal regimes, and, in so doing, produce effects on 
social welfare similar to the effects resulting from rulemaking and enforcement by gov-
ernments, corporate actors are engaged in governance.59 
 
Deborah McBarnet has argued that the work of lobbyists, lawyers, accountants and strategists 
is a fundamental component of global value chains.  This work, which she calls ‘transnational 
legal work’, is  
 
not just about playing with the different laws of different jurisdictions, finding tax—or 
regulatory—havens, set up precisely for that purpose. It is about playing with law per 
se, even within one jurisdiction. It is about constructing ‘creative compliance’, finding 
legal forms which fall outside disadvantageous or inside advantageous legal categories. 
. . . It is about concocting legal forms as yet undreamt of by legislators and regulators.60 
 
From this perspective, law not only acts upon firms, delimiting or regulating their global ac-
tivities; it is also a resource that corporate actors mobilise and innovate to produce certain value 
chain configurations and effects as well as a product of the organisational and business choices 
undertaken by chain actors in and through chain activities. 
 
Our research agenda on the theme of chain governance, then, not only calls for additional con-
sideration of how states, directly and indirectly, shape value chains specifically by and through 
law, but also how firms and chains shape law and sovereignty. Perhaps more than any other, 
this conundrum crystallises the central problematic orienting our project: how to better under-
stand the productive tension between the territorial organisation of law and the jurisdictional 
boundaries that demarcate distinct legal regimes on the one hand, and the global logic of value 
chains that operate across, but also through, these regimes, transforming them in the process, 
on the other.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
By now it should be clear that our research ambition extends well beyond exploring the impact 
of GVCs on legal scholarship or of law on GVCs. Rather, we aim for nothing less than a legal 
ontology of the global value chain, which under conditions of contemporary capitalism, should 
take us some distance toward a richer theoretical and empirical understanding of the global 
economy tout court.  Doubtless, bringing law into the centre of GVC analysis will add sub-
stantial complexity to a field already rife with complexity.  Yet, as we hope we have demon-
strated, the continued relegation of law to ‘exogeneity’ or ‘context’ misses a great deal of the 
constitutive role of law in the structure, geography and function of GVCs, the creation, recog-
nition and distribution of value in GVCs, and the mechanisms through which GVCs are coor-
dinated and controlled.  In other words, simplifying law out of the GVC story leaves many of 
the core explanatory aspirations of the traditional GVC analytic unmet.  Through this interven-
tion, and our future work, we hope to begin to address this gap. 
 
At the same time, we remain cognisant that the GVC is not an objective fact but a heuristic for 
helping to understand the world. And, like any such heuristic, the global value chain cannot 
begin to capture the complexity and contingency characterising real-world global production. 
For this reason, we must remain attuned to the ways in which different theoretical conceptions 
of the GVC are being deployed by or gaining traction with different scholars and institutions 
and the purpose(s) to which those conceptions are being put.  After all, the claim that GVCs 
are the ‘face of the world economy’ can work to naturalise specific ways of organising inter-
national economic activity, and legitimate particular modes of incorporating developing coun-
try-firms into global trade. From this critical perspective, the GVC construct might itself be 
seen as a discursive resource that is being deployed to present as self-evident or inevitable 
developments that result from specific political and economic decisions.61 At the same time, 
the GVC concept is also being mobilised by activists to ‘name and shame’ corporations;62 by 
global union federations seeking to organise a set of workplaces that are linked to the same 
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lead firm;63 and by environmental activists that lobby supermarkets to exclude GMO-products 
from their supply chains.64 
 
In laying out this research agenda, then, we approach GVCs as the terrain from which we can 
construct (hopefully) more useful maps of a rapidly changing and complicated global political 
economy yielding a deeper understanding of the relationship between law, value and power 
and the global political economy more generally. At the same time, we acknowledge that peo-
ple (including us) generally make maps with a particular destination in mind if not in view. 
Thus, even as we pursue our individual and collective projects of value chain mapping, we aim 
to highlight the necessarily political or normative implications of our renderings, an aspiration 
we hope our attention to law, value and power will help us to keep squarely in view.  
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